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As a city, we are in some way responsible for each child in our 
midst.  The obligation and opportunity to stand in loco parentis—in 
the place of a parent—is applicable to state and local governments to 
some highly contested and complicated extent.  The contests and 
complexities are revealed in our family law jurisprudence, for 
although the field of family law is often belittled or trivialized, it is in 
family jurisprudence that a government’s obligations to its people are 
perhaps most tellingly tested.  In what follows, I will explore the reach 
and limits of those obligations. 
First, I will discuss the concept of human dignity and how it 
relates—or should relate—to making judgments about what a 
government owes to its child citizens.  I will draw on constitutional 
theories that have come to prominence since the World Wars and 
caused governments around the world to address more directly the 
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positive duties states may owe to their people and that their people 
may owe to one another.  These theories are instructive, despite the 
ironic fact that they simultaneously enhance our sense of duty to 
children and our duty of restraint against invading their families’ 
autonomy.    
Having laid a foundation of dignitary principles, I will discuss a set 
of family law cases that have tested the limits of governments’ 
responsibilities to children and to their families.  I will first discuss the 
old chestnuts, Meyer v. Nebraska1 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2 
two Supreme Court cases from the 1920s that laid the groundwork for 
the still bitterly contested doctrine of substantive due process.  Next, I 
will discuss Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 the 1972 Supreme Court case in 
which Amish families challenged a requirement that they send their 
children to school until the age of sixteen.  Finally, I will discuss 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services4 and 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales,5 two cases in which the Supreme Court 
found that state and local governments could not be held accountable 
for lapses in their efforts to protect families and children.  I will 
conclude with a comment on the usefulness of the concept of human 
dignity in calibrating governments’ and families’ competing authority 
over, and complementary duty towards, their children. 
I.  THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
I set out my understanding of human dignity rather circuitously.  I 
start with a definition of fundamental right, as that term is understood 
in United States constitutional law.  I then link the notion of 
fundamental right and the notion of human right.  Only then will I be 
in a position to describe how I understand human dignity in the 
context of American constitutional and political thought. 
The Supreme Court gives special protection to certain rights, 
regardless of whether they are mentioned in our Constitution’s text, 
because these rights are deemed to be basic components of human 
freedom.6  Histories and traditions of recognizing a right that is 
                                                                                                                             
 1. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 2. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 
510, 534–35 (1925). 
 3. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 4. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 5. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 6. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (“[T]he ‘liberty’ 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
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fundamental in this way appear to be safe indicators that a right is 
fundamental.7  However, there are reasons to prefer a test that first 
asks whether the exercise of the right is socially benign, and if it is, 
then asks whether the suppression of that right is socially justifiable.8  
Careful balancing of calls for order and for liberty can seem more 
defensible than reference to what we have customarily done.9 
As the world has grown smaller, lawmakers in the United States 
and elsewhere have increasingly looked beyond national borders for 
guidance in determining what rights are so fundamental that they 
should be protected by national and international law.10  At the same 
time, transnational bodies have undertaken codification of individual 
and collective rights that are broadly understood to be fundamental.11  
In transnational contexts, one may speak not just of the civil rights 
that should be guaranteed by a polity to its members, but also more 
generally of human rights that should be guaranteed to all.  Since 
World War II, as international rights codifications have proliferated, 
the use of the term human rights has become more common in legal 
discourse and is now commonly associated with the concept of human 
dignity.12 
In this same post World War II period, the concept of human 
dignity has come to carry new associations: those who drafted new 
constitutions in response to acts and political arrangements that were 
widely regarded as atrocities identified respect for human dignity as 
the principle those atrocities had violated.  Most notably, Germany 
                                                                                                                             
316 U.S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); to 
marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to use contraception, 
ibid.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and to abortion, [Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)].”). 
 7. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612–13 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 8. See id. at 2602 (majority opinion) (“The right to marry is fundamental as a 
matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources alone.  They 
rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives 
define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”). 
 9. See id. at 2598 (describing an analytic method that “respects our history and 
learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present”). 
 10. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
57 (2010). 
 11. The United Nations is required to publish all such treaties. See U.N. Charter 
art. 102, ¶ 1.  Such treaties are also available online. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION https://treaties.un.org [https://perma.cc/L7Y2-DLQU]. 
 12. See Bas de Gaay Fortman, Equal Dignity in International Human Rights, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DIGNITY 355–61 (Marcus Düwell et al. eds., 
2014). 
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after the Holocaust and South Africa after apartheid built new 
constitutions with cornerstones of respect for human dignity.13  This, I 
argue, was a key development toward understanding human dignity 
through protest against its denial. 
Contemporary scholars point out that while dignity was once a 
term referencing the accouterments of noble rank or status, the term 
human dignity is now understood in legal and moral discourse to 
reference the properties or entitlements of “human beings as human 
beings, not dependent on any particular additional status.”14  To 
affront human dignity is, then, to treat a human being or a group of 
human beings without regard for their entitlements as members of the 
human species.  In a world grown increasingly suspicious of hierarchy, 
it is, to borrow a religious concept, to treat them not as if they were a 
little lower than angels, but as if they were something lower still.15 
All that I have said invites the following question: how do we 
decide what behavior is an affront to the dignity of human beings?  I 
propose that we decide what affronts human dignity by reference to 
two kinds of human aversion.  First, affronts to human dignity are (or 
would be in a condition of freedom) intolerable to the victim or 
subject.  Second, they are intolerable in the consensus judgment of 
observers.  They are acts that human beings will neither endure 
without coercion nor tolerate without general approbation. 
While this appears to be a smell test—“I know it when I see it”—it 
is one of a particular and not entirely subjective kind.  It is a collective 
smell test verified in two important ways: (1) by resistance and 
counterdemonstration on the part of those subjected to the practice, 
and (2) by reasoned protest, both by those subjected to the practice 
and by others. 
The rights-seeking process of resistance, counterdemonstration, 
and reasoned protest plays out on a micro level whenever an 
infringement or denial of human dignity is challenged on 
constitutional grounds.  Cases involving children and their families 
                                                                                                                             
 13. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Responsive Constitutionalism and the Idea of 
Dignity, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1373, 1373 (2009). 
 14. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 656–57 (2008). 
 15. Conversely, we might agree with the Stoics that we affront human dignity 
when we engage in behavior that is unworthy of human creatures or “inhumane.”  In 
this alternative sense, dignity is a quality that we achieve through our behavior, 
whereas in the former sense dignity is inalienable.  These two understandings of 
dignity are not congruent.  We might think it undignified (unworthy of a human 
being) to torture any animal, but this is not to say that the animal is endowed with 
human dignity. 
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are special in that they often call for reconciliation of the different, 
sometimes competing dignitary or constitutional rights of various 
family members—often those of children and those of their parents. 
II.  CASE ILLUSTRATIONS 
The following case analyses embody this requirement of 
simultaneous respect.  In assessing each, we are required to balance 
the dignitary status a government owes to children with the dignitary 
status it owes to the adults who care for them. 
The first cases, Meyer and Pierce, are usually cited as pillars of the 
principle that parents have a constitutional right to maintain and 
manage, without official interference, custody and control of their 
children.16  However, Pierce should also be remembered as the case 
that dampened, and perhaps precluded, wholehearted efforts to 
provide universal, high quality education.  Therefore, it holds lessons 
about the tension between educating young citizens in an 
economically diverse community, and honoring the wishes and 
ambitions of all parents. 
Next, I will discuss Wisconsin v. Yoder.17  Like Pierce, it stands for 
the principle of parental autonomy.  However, it raises questions 
about a child’s right to know and draw from worlds beyond a 
community that is isolated, whether by choice or circumstance.  
Therefore, it holds lessons about the tension between subcultural 
integrity and cosmopolitan exposure. 
Finally, I will discuss the cases from Castle Rock, Colorado and 
from the town of Neenah, in Winnebego County, Wisconsin that 
interrogate communities’ obligations to police families for the 
protection of vulnerable family members.18  These cases, therefore, 
speak to the tension between assuring public safety and protecting 
privacy.   
I will argue that thoughtful and simultaneous respect is necessary— 
although I cannot claim that it is sufficient—to successfully manage 
the tensions between protecting and nurturing a city’s youngest 
                                                                                                                             
 16. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923). 
 17. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 18. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding that an 
individual does not have a right to police enforcement of restraining orders where 
police failed to enforce a mother’s restraining order against her children’s father and 
the father abducted and murdered their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
234 (1972) (holding that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a state cannot 
compel an Amish family to cause their children to attend formal high school). 
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citizens and guarding the democratic freedom owed to all of its 
citizens.  I will stress the importance of respect across genders, classes, 
sub-cultures, and generations.  At bottom, though, I want to call 
attention to the kind of respect that is described in human rights 
discourse as the respect warranted by recognition of the inherent 
dignity of every human being. 
A. Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters: Families, 
Education, and Economic Diversity 
Robert Meyer was a teacher who unlawfully taught reading in the 
German language to a ten-year-old child in a one-room parochial 
school in Nebraska.19  The Society of Sisters operated a parochial 
school in Oregon, and the Hill Military Academy was a for-profit 
private school in Oregon. 20  These parties were joined by parents of 
children in their schools to challenge state laws that were passed with 
disparate motives; some xenophobic and others, expressions of 
collective responsibility.21 
World War II inflamed parochial and nativist sentiments, as well as 
narrow patriotism.22  At the same time, communities acted on a desire 
to promote a healthy democracy by making basic education 
universal.23  This mix of sentiments yielded public school 
requirements, and prohibitions against teaching children languages 
other than English, that were advocated both as protections against 
“foreign” influences and as guarantees of an egalitarian and well-
functioning democracy.24 
Advocates for the parents, teachers, and private and parochial 
schools challenged these laws, stressing the more prominent and more 
assailable motives: the need to promote the right kind of patriotism, 
                                                                                                                             
 19. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923). 
 20. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531–32 (1925). 
 21. See DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 
1785–1954, at 155 (1987); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the 
Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 
1041–46 (1992) (discussing the concept of the child as the parents’ property and the 
property rights invoked by the parents in these cases). 
 22. See ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 
1919–1920, at 3–17 (1955); see also Woodhouse, supra note 21, at 1016–20. 
 23. See Kristen Safier, Note, The Question of a Fundamental Right to a 
Minimally Adequate Education, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993 (2001); Woodhouse, supra 
note 21, at 1016–20. 
 24. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FAMILY VALUES (1997); Woodhouse, supra note 21, at 1016–20. 
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to reject foreign ideologies, and to inhibit foreign influence.25  They 
condemned mandatory public schooling as a Platonic and Bolshevist 
idea that had no place in a free democracy.26  The Supreme Court 
took the bait. 
In Meyer, the case challenging a state law restricting foreign 
language education, Justice McReynolds referenced the Spartan 
practice of placing fit six-year-olds in the care of guardians who would 
prepare them to be citizen warriors and concluded that such 
proposals were inconsistent with the United States’ founding 
principles.27  In Pierce, the case challenging a state law mandating 
public school enrollment, Justice McReynolds again wrote, this time 
for a unanimous Court, to say that “[t]he fundamental theory of 
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any 
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them 
to accept instruction from public teachers only.”28  Thus, the 
Fourteenth Amendment came to stand for the principle of family 
liberty.29  Yet at the same time, the Fourteenth Amendment came to 
be seen as a barrier against what might be our best collective response 
to class-based gaps in the quality of childhood education—gaps that 
grow as they mirror and perpetuate an expanding crisis of income 
disparity. 
Concerns about self-perpetuating inequality should cause us to 
think freely and constructively about common schools and common 
systems of childcare.  Écoles Maternelle in France are public pre-
Kindergarten settings of such quality that: (1) few parents choose 
private options, and (2) there is little or no opposition to the public 
investment required to offer excellent care.30  New York City Mayor 
                                                                                                                             
 25. See Woodhouse, supra note 21, at 1016–20. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–02 (1923). 
 28. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 29. The Court’s reliance on the right to teach and to operate a school is a 
reminder that the case also stands for principles of economic liberty: “[Plaintiffs] 
asked [for] protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with 
their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property.” Id. at 
536. 
 30. France has had a system of mandatory, free public education since the late 
nineteenth century. See Shanny Peer & John Burbank, Focus on Early Learning: 
Lessons from the French École Maternelle, ECON. OPPORTUNITY INST. 4, (Jan. 2004), 
http://www.eoionline.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/early-learning/EcolesMaternelles-
Jan04.pdf [https://perma.cc/87CK-X3X7] (“There is broad public support for école 
maternelle in France, where early education and care are viewed not only as a private 
concern for parents, but as a public good and a public responsibility.  The importance 
of pre-kindergarten and other services for young French children is unquestioned, 
taken for granted by parents, politicians, and the public alike.  A consensus exists 
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Bill de Blasio’s free pre-kindergarten initiative might be thought of 
similarly.  It may be a mistake to criticize the program, as some have, 
as money wasted on families able to afford private systems of care.  In 
fact, it might be hugely beneficial if New York children of all classes 
mingle in settings fit for the nurturing and socialization of young 
citizens. 
B. Wisconsin v. Yoder: Open Opportunity and Cultural Diversity 
Wisconsin v. Yoder solidified (at least temporarily) the principle of 
parental authority and autonomy announced in Meyer and Pierce, 
and cautioned against indifference to children’s’ needs.31  It involved 
Amish parents who resisted a less onerous requirement than the one 
challenged in Pierce—a requirement that children attend some 
school, public or private, until the age of sixteen.32  These parents 
objected to formal education beyond the eighth grade and wished to 
remove their children from school whenever they had completed 
eighth grade.33  They regarded secular high school as a corrupting 
experience and wished to engage their children instead in the 
program of learning through work that their religion required.34 
As the Court explained, the Amish community believed that “high 
school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, 
self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with 
other students,”35 whereas “Amish society emphasizes informal 
learning-through-doing; a life of ‘goodness,’ rather than a life of 
intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge, community 
welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than 
integration with, contemporary worldly society.”36 
The case was well-litigated on behalf of the Amish parents.  The 
record contained expert testimony supporting the position that 
ordinary high school education would be both emotionally harmful to 
Amish children and destructive to the Amish community.37  The 
expert testimony was buttressed with evidence that the Amish way of 
                                                                                                                             
across the political spectrum about the importance of école maternelle, and it 
receives support from all political parties.  Not to support it would be political suicide 
for a politician.”). 
 31. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 32. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West 2016); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. 
 33. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. 
 34. See id. at 210. 
 35. Id. at 211. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 216–19. 
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rearing children produced citizens who were exceptionally law-
abiding and self-sufficient as farmers and housewives.38  On this 
record, the Supreme Court held, both as a matter of religious freedom 
and as a matter of constitutionally protected parental rights that 
Amish parents had to be exempt from the requirement to send their 
children to school until the age of sixteen.39 
The disposition of this case was not a foregone conclusion.  The 
Court had long held that religious conviction could not protect plural 
marriages.40  Moreover, it had held that religious and familial rights 
were too feeble to protect a family member’s choice to permit her 
child to follow a religious obligation to distribute proselytizing 
literature.41  Nonetheless, only Justice Douglas voiced any dissent in 
Yoder.  He dissented with respect to those cases in which the 
parent(s), not the child, had sought relief.42  With his eye 
simultaneously on the child’s freedom and potential and on the 
parents’ authority, Douglas argued that the decision affected the 
liberty interests of a child who “may want to be a pianist or an 
astronaut or an oceanographer.”43 
Toleration of diverse child-rearing practices is key to our 
democracy.  It assures that our culture is enriched by different 
grounding philosophies, values, and life choices.  It protects against 
what Justice Douglas himself referred to in another context as a 
totalitarian theory of culture and governance.44  Democracy means, in 
part, freedom to reject state-sanctioned orthodoxies and go one’s own 
way.  Still, democracies are concerned with the nurturance of young 
citizens, and it is not wrong to ask that they be given an educational—
not to speak of a material (in the form of food, shelter, and protection 
                                                                                                                             
 38. See id. at 222. 
 39. See id. at 232–34. 
 40. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878). 
 41. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944). 
 42. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 244. 
 44. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521–22 (1961) (quoting R. L. Calhoun, 
Democracy and Natural Law, 5 NAT. L. F. 31, 36 (1960)) (“One of the earmarks of 
the totalitarian understanding of society is that it seeks to make all subcommunities—
family, school, business, press, church—completely subject to control by the State.  
The State then is not one vital institution among others: a policeman, a referee, and a 
source of initiative for the common good.  Instead, it seeks to be coextensive with 
family and school, press, business community, and the Church, so that all of these 
component interest groups are, in principle, reduced to organs and agencies of the 
State.  In a democratic political order, this megatherian concept is expressly rejected 
as out of accord with the democratic understanding of social good, and with the 
actual make-up of the human community.”). 
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from violence)—platform from which they may find their own way in 
life.  The difficulty is in distinguishing platforms of support and 
channels to orthodox choices. 
The Italian town of Reggio Emilia has famously avoided the Scylla 
of indoctrination and the Charybdis of neglect by creating preschools 
that nurture, not by feeding information and instruction, but instead 
by encouraging activities that honor each child’s independence, 
encourage collaboration rather than hierarchy, and demonstrate faith 
that children will learn as they follow their curiosity.45 
The principle of family announced in Meyer and followed in Pierce 
is admirable, but Justice Douglas was right to caution that we owe 
respect both to the dignity of independent families and to the dignity 
and the unknowable potential of a developing child.  Social support 
need not be totalitarian, and as the Reggio schools demonstrate, 
education systems can be designed to liberate rather than to 
indoctrinate. 
C. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services 
and Castle Rock v. Gonzales: The Tension Between Public Safety 
and Family Privacy 
The last cases—DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services46 and Castle Rock v. Gonzales47—present the dangers 
of failures of support.  They are representative of a jurisprudential 
tradition that insists that our constitution is one of negative, not 
positive rights.  That tradition guarantees freedom from government 
intervention, but does not confer positive rights or benefits. 
The dissenting justices in Obergefell v. Hodges, the same-sex 
marriage case, most recently and prominently relied on this 
tradition.48  Justice Roberts said, for example that “[o]ur cases have 
consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield provided 
by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive 
entitlements from the State.”49  In support of this assertion, the Chief 
Justice cited DeShaney as well as San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez,50 a case arguably holding that our federal 
                                                                                                                             
 45. See CAROLYN EDWARDS ET AL., THE HUNDRED LANGUAGES OF CHILDREN: 
THE REGGIO EMILIA APPROACH TO EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION (1993). 
 46. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 47. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 48. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 49. Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 50. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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constitution contains no guarantee of a right to education.  As I will 
discuss later, Justice Roberts could also have cited Gonzales.51 
DeShaney involved the claim of a child who had been severely 
brain-damaged as a result of repeated beatings by his father.52  The 
family had been under the supervision of an official child protective 
agency for more than two years53 during which the child was twice 
hospitalized as a result of his father’s violence.54  The child’s claim 
was that as a matter of due process this government agency owed him 
a duty of protection that it had negligently failed to meet.55  A 
majority of the Justices rejected the child’s claim, holding, in effect, 
that it was what Justice Roberts described in his Obergefell dissent: 
an unauthorized request for positive rights.56 
The Gonzales case was similar.57  Jessica Gonzales had been a 
victim of domestic violence.58  She had gone to a local court and 
obtained a strongly worded order of protection.59  The strong wording 
reflected feminist efforts over the years to assure that such orders 
would provide some measure of actual protection.60  The order 
announced that the arrest of her abusive husband was mandatory in 
the face of reasonable evidence of a violation of its terms.61 
Jessica Gonzales called her local precinct repeatedly over the 
course of an evening to report that her husband had taken their three 
daughters in violation of the order and that she feared for her 
daughters’ safety.62  With each call, she was told to wait to see what 
happened and to call back if the matter was not resolved.  Finally, 
                                                                                                                             
 51. See infra notes 57–69 and accompanying text. 
 52. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191–93 
(1989). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Compare id. at 204 (“The Court’s baseline is the absence of positive rights in 
the Constitution and a concomitant suspicion of any claim that seems to depend on 
such rights.”), with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J. 
dissenting). 
 57. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 58. See id. at 751. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. (alteration in original) (“The original form order, issued on May 21, 
1999, and served on respondent’s husband on June 4, 1999, commanded him not to 
‘molest or disturb the peace of [respondent] or of any child,’ and to remain at least 
100 yards from the family home at all times.”). 
 61. See id. at 752. 
 62. See id. at 753. 
1020 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
after midnight, she went to the precinct.63  While she was there her 
husband drove by, firing from his car window at the police station.64  
The husband was killed by police officers’ return fire.65  The bodies of 
the three girls were found in the trunk of his car.66 
The Supreme Court held that the police had not violated a 
constitutionally enforceable duty.67  Subsequently, however, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights issued a decision finding the 
United States responsible for human rights violations against Jessica 
Gonzales (then Jessica Lenahan) and her three deceased children for 
its failure to take adequate measures to address domestic violence.68  
The Commission relied on principles developed to assure that 
governments address the realities of intra-familial abuse and 
pervasive violence against women by providing appropriately 
respectful and reasonably effective mechanisms against domestic 
violence.69  In doing so, it honored the dignity of women and their 
children while giving appropriate respect to the dignity and liberty of 
their families. 
CONCLUSION 
What can we make of these cases and of the state of our laws 
regarding families and children?  Do we as a society have an 
obligation to give children the physical and intellectual support to 
become active members of a democratic citizenry?  Do we have the 
right—or the obligation—to expose them to ideas and opportunities 
that their families may not favor?  How do we protect a healthy 
diversity and guard against totalitarian control?  Putting aside the 
question of whether we owe children any duty of nurturance or any 
platform for choosing their own way and fulfilling their unique 
potential, do we owe them any duty of basic protection? 
These questions defy simple answers.  But there are guides we 
might follow as we attempt to resolve them: (1) we might join the 
increasing number of nations that hold themselves, by constitution or 
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international treaty, obligated to respect the dignity of all human 
beings and accept the possibility that respect for human dignity 
implies positive obligations of nurturance and care, (2) we might bind 
ourselves to honor the fact that respect for human dignity implies 
respect for diverse life choices,70 and (3) we might commit ourselves 
to struggling to reconcile these two propositions, for although both 
are honorable they are all too easily at war with each other. 
Attention to these guides would do much to assure that little 
citizens thrive within democratically free families. 
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